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When network externalities are important for a product, there is often a move to introduce 
standards on the basis of product modularity such that product interfaces remain constant over 
time and across brands. This allows other firms to develop complementary products and 
services.  However, introducing standardization can lead to a weakening of the technology 
developer’s competitive position.  Standardization makes much of the underlying product 
knowledge accessible, reducing barriers to entry such that other manufacturers are able to 
quickly develop comparable products.  Thus in cases where network externalities are important 
and standardization needs to occur, there are also needs to protect knowledge that may form 
the basis for the developer’s competitive position within the industry.  To review the differing 
approaches to managing technical knowledge we deconstruct product architectures into clusters 
of technical knowledge that we refer to as information structures.  We use the notion of 
knowledge structures to study how different components of a product architecture can be made 
open in the form of standards, whereas other elements can be heavily protected.  To study 
these issues, we chose the mobile phone industry.  Nokia and Ericsson were instrumental in 
developing the GSM standard and pushing for its institutionalising across Europe.  However, 
both of these firms still remain dominant in the manufacture of mobile phones.  Thus we sought 
to observe how they managed various clusters of technical knowledge such that the standard 
was open, a range of firms has produced complementary products, and yet Nokia and 
Ericsson’s competitive position within the industry has not been diminished. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Standards are important within the mobile (cellular) phone industry as they provide the basis for 
different phones from different manufacturers to be able to communicate with each other.  More 
recently standards have also become important for the development of complementary products 
and services.  Today’s mobile phones interlink with a number of other ‘smart technologies’, are 
web enabled and in some countries, form the basis of a smart card system whereby they can be 
used to purchase basic products.  When standards exist such that interface specifications are 
defined as a way of allowing other firms to develop complementary products and services, there 
is very often a loss of control over the technology.  We draw upon the same examples used by 
industrial economists in discussing the role of standards to show that most firms that have 
developed a standard have later become just one of many producers of a particular product.  
That is, by adopting an open architecture, the developers of the technology ultimately lessened 
their competitive position.  Examples include the RCA colour television standard and the 
Matsushita VHS videocassette recorder.  Thus we suggest that in cases of network externalities, 
it is necessary for firms to purposely diffuse knowledge that relates to the standard to allow 
complementary firms to enter the system, and yet simultaneously protect the knowledge that 
underlies any competitive advantage that the firm may enjoy within the industry. 
 
To consider how these dual, and potentially conflicting aims may be met, we deconstruct the 
product architectures into clusters of related technical knowledge that we call information 
structures and then further deconstruct these into component level knowledge.  We propose that 
by using clusters of technical knowledge (or information structures), that it is possible to follow 
how complete sets of knowledge that underlie specific functions of the mobile phone are dealt 
with by mobile phone manufacturers. 
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Nokia and L. M. Ericsson are two of the big three mobile phone manufacturers in the world.  
Interestingly, both were instrumental in having the air interface protocol of GSM adopted initially 
as a pan-European standard, and later as the most popular standard in the world.  They have 
managed to develop the GSM standard and to simultaneously draw numerous firms into 
developing complementary products and services.  However, they have done all of this without 
their competitive positions within the industry being compromised.  Applying the notion of 
information structures, we propose that there are three major clusters of technical information to 
do with mobile phones, and on the basis of our interviews with numerous managers at Nokia 
and Ericsson we show how the various information structures have been managed in different 
ways such that these firms’ competitiveness has been enhanced rather than compromised. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF STANDARDIZATION AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 
 
The standardization of products can create significant benefits to both consumers and firms 
within an industry (Farrell and Saloner, 1985).  Standardization allows for compatibility in terms 
of complementary products and services.  For example, standardization of television broadcasts 
allow for different broadcasters to be received on different televisions.  Similarly, different brands 
of stereo systems all play standard audio CDs.  What standardization does is to keep all the 
interfaces of product constant such that a range of different firms can develop complementary 
products or services (Langlois and Robertson, 1992).  That is, stereos from different 
manufacturers can operate in different ways internally but they must each be capable of reading 
standard CDs, accepting signals from other inputs such as a videocassette recorder for home 
theatre and outputting data in standard forms that can then drive any speaker system.  Thus for 
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standardization to occur, there must be consistency across the product architecture both over 
time and across brands in terms of interface specifications.  For example, in the personal 
computer (PC) industry, “. . . for each layer of the network there are published standards and 
interface protocols that allow hardware and software products from many vendors to blend 
seamlessly into the network” (Morris and Ferguson, 1993: 88). 
 
Standardization of products is particularly important when the benefit derived from the product is 
dependent upon the number and range of complementary products and services (that is, when 
network externalities are important).  For example, the benefit that an owner of a videocassette 
recorder derives will be partially dependent upon the range of videos that are available for hire, 
the number of places that these videos can be hired from and the frequency of repair shops that 
can service the video recorder should a problem arise.  The availability of these complementary 
products and services are often highly correlated with the number of people that use a 
compatible standard (in this case compatible video recorders).  Hence it is important for 
manufacturers of a product whose success is dependent upon complementary products and 
services, that they standardize all product interfaces to easily allow other firms to develop the 
products and services that will support their product.  This in turn will attract further users of the 
standard (the installed base), which then in a cyclical manner will most likely further increase the 
number of firms producing complementary products and services.  The benefits of a large 
installed base reinforcing the dominance of a particular standard underlies Teece’s (1986) notion 
of the benefits of a dominant design as one of the three building blocks for profiting from an 
innovation. 
 
However, the pursuit of a large installed base, or the achievement of a dominant design has a 
number of downsides, the most common and significant being the loss of control over the 
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technology.  The classic example is the battle between the VHS and Betamax standards in the 
field of video recorders.  In many respects the Betamax model by Sony was superior, however, 
the policy of licensing the VHS technology by Matsushita and flooding the market with VHS 
models allowed the VHS standard to win the battle as the number of complementary products 
and services far outnumbered the Betamax offerings (Cusumano, Myolandis and Rosenbloom, 
1992).  Today Matsushita is just one of many producers of VHS video recorders.  Similar 
examples exist in other industries such as the computer industry where Sun started in the 
workstation market well behind Apollo.  However, by creating an open architecture and allowing 
other suppliers to become involved, Sun rapidly overtook Apollo (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 
1993).  The problem for Sun now, is that they are fighting off new competitors in the workstation 
market that have entering the market using the same (open) architecture that Sun developed 
(Baldwin and Clark, 1997).  Thus, success in industries where network externalities are 
important often comes from having a large installed base and attracting producers of 
complementary products and services.  To attract these complementary firms, at least the 
interfaces need to be standardized, but in most cases, the whole product is standardized to the 
extent that it utilizes an open product architecture.  This process can lower the barriers to entry 
to the industry and lessen the competitive position of the original innovator. 
 
The benefits of standards when network externalities are important and the way that standards 
wars are played out through the use of the installed base, first mover advantages, 
complementary assets and other factors has been well covered through a collection of literature 
that is grounded in industrial economics (for example, see David and Greenstein, 1990; Farrell 
and Saloner, 1985; 1986; 1992; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; 1992 Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  
However, what is less well covered is the loss of control over the technology that can 
accompany the standardization process when appropriability regimes are not high (in that the 
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technology cannot be easily protected).  Reviewing many of the cases that these and other 
authors refer to (e.g. Hill, 1997; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996) in their work on standardization 
shows that in many cases the original innovator or developer of the technology eventually just 
became one of a number of manufacturers of the product.  For example, consider how each of 
the following innovators of a standard are today just one of many producers of products within 
that standard: the Matsushita VHS video recorder, the IBM PC, the Sun workstation, the RCA 
colour television and Kodak 35mm film. 
 
Thus, for products where network externalities are important, there are dual needs in terms of 
managing the technology.  On one hand it is preferable to standardize interfaces such that 
complementary products and services are developed and so that the largest group of 
consumers possible adopts the technology.  However, to avoid loss of control, the firm that 
developed the product should try and protect the knowledge that provides the product with a 
competitive advantage such that it cannot be easily incorporated into other firm’s offerings. 
 
To demonstrate these dual needs of sharing knowledge with complementary firms and 
simultaneously protecting knowledge, it is interesting to follow the story of Apple and the 
development of the Graphical User Interface (GUI) versus the PC.  The first successful 
application of GUIs by Xerox was commercially unsuccessful, as it was an entirely closed 
system and so the product was not adequately supported in terms of software (that is network 
externalities were important, but complementary firms could not enter the larger production 
system).  Apple, however, succeeded on their second attempt with the Macintosh (following the 
Lisa) as it allowed for third parties to become involved at the software development level through 
having an architecture that was not quite as closed (Morris and Ferguson, 1993).  The most 
open system though, was the IBM PC.  Through an open architecture, the PC by IBM (and 
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clones) advanced very rapidly.  Even though many believed the Macintosh to be a superior 
system, particularly prior to the introduction of Windows, the PC became the dominant design 
because of complementary products such as software and the rapid development of the product 
through having multiple suppliers involved.  Thus an open architecture approach won the 
dominant design battle and created the largest installed base.  However, IBM, the developer of 
the architecture, failed to benefit extensively from their innovation as it was easily replicated.   
 
In much the same way, manufacturers of mobile phones face the same conundrum: opening up 
their architecture would allow for even more complementary products and services, thus 
ensuring success for the phone.  However, it is also likely to lead to a loss of control, or at least it 
would allow competitors to more easily enter the industry and erode the position of the present 
market leaders.  At this point, we move our discussion to deconstructing product architectures to 
explain how it is possible for a product architecture to contain elements that are open, and yet 
for other technical information to be protected. 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE TYPES AND INFORMATION STRUCTURES 
 
Complex systems are hierarchical in nature.  It is possible to deconstruct systems into 
components, which in turn can be deconstructed into finer components and so on.  Simon 
(1962: 26) provides a biological example whereby a biological organism can be deconstructed 
into “organs, which are composed of cells, which contain organelles, which are composed of 
molecules”.  In much the same way, complex products can be deconstructed.  For example, a 
bicycle is made up of parts such as wheels, and wheels contain components such as hubs, and 
hubs contain ball bearings. 
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Deconstructing products can be interesting in that it allows us to see the various component 
parts involved.  From an academic perspective, it forms the basis for much of the work done in 
the area of modularity (e.g. see Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995).  
However, except in the development of modular product architectures or reverse engineering, 
few firms are overly concerned with the deconstruction process.  Instead they are interested in 
the construction process, whereby components are combined in such a way as to create an 
operational system.  Construction of a product using existing components and an existing 
product architecture (that is something akin to a set of instructions as to how components fit 
together) is relatively uncomplicated.  Simply assemble the components as per the instructions.  
However, if you want to change any component within the system, particularly if you wish to 
innovate, then the task becomes far more complex.  To start making changes at the component 
level, knowledge must exist as to the operation of the component in terms of how it works and 
why it works in a particular way (Galvin, 1999).  Thus to construct a bicycle, a firm can simply 
assemble the components as per the defined architecture.  To innovate though, requires an 
understanding of how each component works.  For example, to change the ball bearings in the 
hub of a bicycle wheel would require an understanding of how the ball bearings work.  That is, if 
you wanted to make the wheel spin more efficiently would you need ball bearings that are larger 
or smaller in diameter, or would it be preferable to use another input such as needle bearings?  
Thus to innovate and construct a product that does not already have a well-defined product 
architecture requires an understanding of how each component functions.  The knowledge that 
creates this understanding is referred to in this paper as component level knowledge.  Such a 
notion is not new.  For example, Henderson and Clark (1990) differentiate between component 
level knowledge (how a component operates) and architectural knowledge (how components fit 
together to form a functional system). 
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Component level knowledge is the basic building block for being able to innovate in regard to 
complex products.  However, to be able to alter complex products through changing 
components, there needs to be a higher level of understanding.  In particular, there needs to be 
an understanding of how and why components must link with each other in a particular way.  
That is, there is a level of knowledge that builds upon component level knowledge to do with 
component interfaces and thus the operation of a component within a larger system.  For 
example, to understand how each element of a bicycle wheel works and how a frame is 
constructed does not inform one that a design placing the wheels closer together will create a 
‘faster’ more manoeuvrable bicycle, whereas a longer wheelbase will produce a more 
comfortable bicycle.  It is this understanding of the interface, that when combined with 
component level knowledge that produces what we refer to in this paper as the information 
structure.  The information structure is thus a knowledge map of how and why each component 
must link in with the other components of the product in a particular way for an operational 
product to result. 
 
The concept of an information structure has received some coverage in the literature.  Sanchez 
and Mahoney (1996) use the notion of an information structure to describe ‘the glue’ that allows 
a functional product to emerge from a series of interlinked components.  In discussing modular 
products, they posit that a well defined information structure can act as an embedded form of 
coordination mechanism for loosely coupled organizational structures (as per Orton and Weick’s 
(1990) conceptualisation of loosely coupled systems).  In providing a definition of information 
structures, Galvin (1999: 469) describes an information structure as covering what components 
will be included in the system and their functions, knowledge of the physical and spatial 
connections between components and knowledge of how to measure performance and 
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conformity of the components within the system.  For the purposes of this paper, we use the 
same basic approach whereby the information structure includes the component level 
knowledge as well as defining how the components fit together spatially, functionally and 
physically on the basis of how they operate independently and interdependently.  Thus in the 
case of the mobile phone industry, component level knowledge such as how and why the 
transmitters in mobile phones operate is the first step in being able to build an information 
structure that outlines how the transmitter and the various other components will be integrated 
into a complete system for signal processing such that voice and data can be effectively 
transferred between two users of mobile phones.   
 
The information structure is thus a conglomerate of technical knowledge that includes both 
component level knowledge as well as knowledge of how all of these components fit together 
and interact to form a functional system (what is referred to as architectural knowledge by 
Henderson and Clark, 1990).  In the case of complex products, we suggest that it is possible to 
have multiple information structures, as information structures are clusters of technical 
knowledge based around a group of interdependent components.  For example, in a Walkman 
there may be one information structure concerning the driving of the tape and another to do with 
the reading and the production of music.  There are a series of components from the power 
supply to the motor that turns the tape that would form one information structure as a cluster of 
knowledge based around a singular function.  There is another that starts with the head 
mechanism and finishes with an amplified musical output through the headphones.  This is a 
relatively independent cluster of knowledge in that it is possible to change the entire driving 
mechanism and as long as the new system still drives the tape spools then an operational 
product would still result. 
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This concept of independent clusters of knowledge is where the notion of information structures 
fundamentally differs from Henderson and Clark’s writings about architectural knowledge.  They 
posit that there is a level of knowledge that is based upon the component (component 
knowledge) and another about the way that components fit together to form a system 
(architectural knowledge).  Thus is the Walkman example, architectural knowledge exists in 
reference to the way that every component interfaces with every other adjoining component.  In 
comparison, our notion of information structures contain both component level knowledge and 
architectural level knowledge, but we focus upon a singular function within the complex product 
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Above the information structure lies the product architecture.  This is the physical design 
manifestation of the information structure.  Baldwin and Clark (1997: 86) define an architecture 
as “. . . what modules [components] will be part of the system and what their functions will be”.  
For example, one of the basic advances that make mobile phones so successful relative to other 
mobile communications devices (e.g. CB radios) is the way that multiple signals are able to 
occupy the same time/space frequency (Agrawal and Sreenan, 1999).  This knowledge is 
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incorporated into an information structure covering how the mobile phone transmitter and 
operating software will interlink (forming part of the total information structure for the signal 
processing element of the mobile phone).  That is, knowledge of how transmitters and mobile 
phone software work provides a knowledge structure of how they need to be integrated.  The 
product architecture is the manifestation of this information structure, describing how 
components need to be integrated to create a ‘blue-print’ for the design of this part of the 
product, but by itself revealing nothing as to why the phone must be constructed in this manner.  
Continuing with the signal processing example, the architecture would detail an integrated 
system whereby the transmitted data for each call is given a unique sequence code allowing it to 
be distinguished from the data of other calls.  However, the architecture does not indicate why 
this needs to occur, rather only how it occurs. 
 
We see information structures as an analytical tool that will enable us to conceptualise and 
eventually group different elements of knowledge together based on technical grounds.  In 
essence, we view information structures as clusters of knowledge that are comprised of 
component level knowledge and the knowledge of how these components operate 
interdependently.  For example, an information structure may exist in relation to signal 
processing which is a cluster of knowledge about how all the components involved in signal 
processing operate and how they operate together to make for a functionally system. 
 
It was proposed earlier that some knowledge that relates to product interfaces must be 
transferable such that complementary products and services can be developed.  However, other 
elements of knowledge must be able to be protected within the firm as a basis for a competitive 
advantage.  By deconstructing product architectures into information structures and component 
level knowledge, we are capable of now discussing clusters of knowledge in terms of common 
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technical characteristics as being capable of being transferred or protected.  We believe that this 
classification system for technical knowledge clusters is more useful within the context of our 
research for discussing the potential for knowledge diffusion or protection than some of the more 
traditional classification systems such as component versus architectural knowledge or the 
broader dichotomy of tacit versus explicit knowledge.  As the knowledge that we are concerned 
with in this paper is technical in nature (such as interface specifications and communications 
protocols) most of the knowledge exists in fairly explicit forms.  Thus we need to classify the 
different elements of knowledge in a way that covers the natural groupings of knowledge that 
are protected or purposely diffused.  We suggest that deconstructing architectures into technical 
knowledge clusters is the first step to studying the knowledge management approaches used by 
Nokia and Ericsson. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD  
 
This research started from the observation that considerable work has been done in the area of 
the effect of network externalities and how such conditions affect industry level competitiveness.  
However, much of this research is grounded in industrial economics whereby the micro issues of 
how knowledge is managed such that architectures becomes either open or closed has been 
largely ignored.  We believe that the role of the firm and their knowledge management systems 
are important.  Within the mobile phone industry, what is immediately noticeable is that Nokia of 
Finland and Ericsson of Sweden form two of the three big players in the industry (with Motorola 
being the third major player).  Nokia and Ericsson were virtually unheard of outside of their own 
countries prior to the 1980s yet they have outperformed almost all Japanese, other European 
and US mobile phone manufacturers.  In contrast, firms such as NEC, Sony and Matsushita 
have failed within the industry to this point, even though the mobile phone is a product that fits 
 
  Page 15 
very nicely into the broad Japanese capability of manufacturing products that are designed for 
consumers (as opposed to industrial users), are based upon microelectronics and are subject to 
miniaturization.   
 
Our review of the literature to do with the existence of network externalities in cases where there 
are a variety of standards shows that the creation of a large installed base is critical in attracting 
further complementary products and services and thus providing a basis for becoming the 
dominant design.  However, a review of the same literature, particularly the numerous case 
examples that were discussed, shows that the provision of an open architecture to allow 
complementary firms to enter into the broader support system for the product often leads to a 
loss of control of the technology and a corresponding loss of competitive position within the 
industry.  For example, see the VHS versus Betamax wars in video recorders, the PC versus the 
Macintosh in computers, Sun versus Apollo workstations, RCA versus CBS television standards, 
35mm versus 70mm film, and even the failings of both the Philips digital cassette versus the 
Sony Minidisk as formats to replace the CD with a recordable digital audio format.  Thus we 
came to the conclusion that in many cases where network externalities are present, there is a 
need to both protect knowledge to maintain a competitive advantage and yet simultaneously 
diffuse elements of knowledge pertaining to the product throughout the industry so as to attain a 
large installed base.  This became an assumption on which this research was based and all 
conclusions need to be read with this assumption in mind. 
 
Given this assumption, our research question was: 
How can knowledge be managed such that some components that make up the product 
architecture are accessible and transferable whereas other elements are highly protected within 
the firm? 
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The traditional tacit versus explicit dichotomy for knowledge classification was unlikely to assist 
in this process as the majority of the knowledge that we sought to investigate was of a technical 
nature and therefore tended to be relatively explicit.  Hence our approach was to deconstruct the 
knowledge pertaining to the mobile phone around key technical areas.  We would then assess 
the extent to which these various elements of knowledge were protected and how they were 
protected.  In a similar approach, for those elements that were made open, we would review how 
these elements of knowledge were revealed to others within the industry. 
 
We collected information about the types of knowledge that are required for the manufacture of 
mobile phones from the technical literature that exists and then supplemented this material with 
interviews with a number of senior people within both Nokia and Ericsson.  In terms of reviewing 
how knowledge was protected and diffused within the industry we used these same interviews 
on location at Nokia and Ericsson. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MOBILE TELEPHONY 
 
For mobile phone manufacturers everywhere, success in the initial analogue systems came 
about through producing products that were competitive in the attributes of size and weight.  As 
the analogue systems were incapable of transmitting data (being based upon electrical 
impulses), there were no opportunities to integrate the phones with other products.  Success in 
the industry therefore came down to reducing the size of the components in the phone, 
designing the internal circuitry of the phone to be more efficient in relation to power 
consumption, and working with battery manufacturers to develop more powerful, longer lasting 
batteries. 
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The multiplicity of analogue standards around the world made it difficult to conduct research and 
development activities for all standards present.  Even though the analogue systems tended to 
differ primarily in the frequency used for transmission of signals, most large European countries 
(with the exception of the Nordic countries covered by NMT), Japan and the US all utilized 
different systems.  The success of the NMT system in the Nordic countries in terms of the 
number of users, provided financial inflows to the local manufacturers to be able to move ahead 
in terms of design and weight.  For example, in 1989 there were 75,000 mobile telephone 
subscribers in the Nordic countries as compared with 40,000 in the US Bell system and less 
than 10,000 each in Britain, Germany and France (Pulkinnen, 1997: 89).  The Nordic 
manufacturers (Nokia and Ericsson) were then able to leverage their knowledge from the NMT 
market and develop phones for other markets.  Between 1984 and 1988, Nokia for example, 
entered 20 different international markets (Pulkkinen, 1997). 
 
While the first analogue systems were being rolled-out in the United States, the Nordic countries 
of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden were developing a new standard, NMT-450. 
While analogue in nature, the NMT standard was far more advanced than all other analogue 
standards in that it utilized digital switching technology and advanced base station design that 
accentuated the ability of smooth ‘handover’ for users while moving between cells.  Developing 
these technologies facilitated research and development by the Nordic manufacturers in the 
development of digital type technologies, which put Nokia and Ericsson in a leading position 
when digital standards were adopted. 
 
In Europe, the diversity of analogue standards created an inefficient system in terms of roaming 
and thus European operators and standards makers colluded to deliver a pan-European digital 
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solution.  The European Commission reserved frequency blocks across Europe further 
facilitating European roaming for users with one terminal.  Thus the GSM ‘second generation’ 
digital standard gained broad acceptance throughout the European Union and was accepted as 
the European standard in 1987.  Bekkers and Smits (1998: 40) note that all EU countries had at 
least two GSM networks operating in 1998, with the exception of Luxembourg. The standard 
was also accepted in a more limited fashion in the United States, the Asia-Pacific and other 
markets throughout the 1990s.  As a digital format capable of transmitting both voice and data, 
the GSM standard provided much greater potential for complementary products to work with the 
mobile phone.  As such, the second generation of mobile phones were able to able to provide 
the network connection for computers, to transfer faxes and emails.  Advanced systems allowed 
for short message or email transfers without being linked to a computer. 
 
In comparison, American mobile phone manufacturers were distracted by a multiplicity of 
analogue standards.  Due to the relatively low take-up rate of mobile phones in the US and the 
problems that had occurred in respect of analogue systems, the US was a very late entrant into 
digital technology.  Again a number of standards were to exist in conjunction with each other (D-
AMPS, IS-95, GSM).  Wooldridge (1999) notes the problems in the US market continue as there 
is competition between standards because of the fragmentation of the US market into regional 
licence areas (an artefact of the AT&T divestiture policies) and the continuation of ‘receiving 
party pays’ for mobile services.  All of these complications have reduced economies of scale for 
all sections of the industry and have required further knowledge resources to be devoted to 
overcoming peripheral complications. The multiplicity of standards has made it difficult for 
complementary manufacturers to enter the industry and assist in the development of the mobile 
phones and associated products. 
 
 
  Page 19 
In Japan, a number of factors confounded the ability of producers and network operators to 
develop successful terminal equipment for second generation systems.  First, mobile telephony 
in Japan was a tightly regulated monopoly for many years, and the network operator (NTT) had 
a market view of mobile telephony as a high-value service for a limited number of customers.  
Japanese producers were thus distracted by a home-market that demanded terminal equipment 
that could not be utilized elsewhere and a perception by both policy makers and NTT that mobile 
telephony was only to develop as a niche market.  In addition, the economic conditions in Japan 
in the late 1980s (when digital standards were being developed) were far from supportive of the 
development of a new NTT based digital standard.  The collapse of the “bubble economy” 
created economic turmoil among Japan’s industrial conglomerates, many of who were key 
players in the national microelectronics industries. This in turn, tended to constrict their ability to 
dedicate resources to new technology R&D at a key time in the mobile industry’s development. 
 
Unlike analogue systems, success for manufacturers of digital mobile phones is dependent upon 
the quality of the phone (such as the number of features) and the extent of the complementary 
products and services.  The importance of size and weight are becoming less important as 
phones take on additional features which actually require larger phones.  For example, more 
phones are being released that have internet capabilities and new capabilities such as live video 
feeds will be introduced with the third generation systems.  At this stage we move to 
deconstructing the product architecture behind the Nokia and Ericsson mobile phones as a way 
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INFORMATION STRUCTURES IN MOBILE PHONES 
 
We suggest that there are three relatively independent information structures that underlie the 
operation of each mobile phone.  The first information structure is the air interface protocol.  
These have traditionally been set by relevant government agencies in particular countries or 
regions and are designed to ensure that the mobile telephone network can operate as a 
coherent whole.  Once a standard is set by the government, Pulkinnen, (1997) suggests that it 
takes about two years to put in place the necessary infrastructure.  Due to the need for multiple 
firms to be able to work with the standard, the information structure is codified (e.g. operates on 
the 900 Mhz band) and is completely accessible by potential industry players.  Nokia and 
Ericsson were instrumental in having GSM adopted as a Pan-European standard due to their 
advanced research standing and their willingness to make GSM a non-proprietary standard. 
 
The second information structure has to do with the way individual cellular mobile telephones 
operate within this protocol, such as signal processing, and transfer of data with complementary 
products such as computers and other ‘smart’ technology products.  Within this paper we refer to 
this information structure as dealing with connectivity issues as it is centred around the way 
individual phones connect to other phones and interact with complementary products and 
services.  Much of the second information structure is built around certain software elements and 
some hardware elements that include critical components that interface with complementary 
products and services. 
 
The third information structure creates the functionality for the specific mobile phone.  Much of 
the focus in this area was initially on developing ways to reduce the size and the weight of the 
phone.  A more recent focus has been to increase the number of features and functions offered 
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such as voice recognition dialling and diary functions.  A diagrammatic presentation of these 























































Figure 2:  The three information structures and examples of component level knowledge that 




PROTECTING AND SHARING INFORMATION STRUCTURES 
 
Air Interface Information Structures 
The air interface protocol that is predominantly used by Nokia and Ericsson (GSM) is completely 
open in terms of the underlying knowledge being accessible by others.  Technical specifications 
exist in the form of manuals that can be accessed by all those who are presently in, or wish to 
enter the industry.  This openness was part of the process of having GSM adopted as the Pan-
European standard.  Paetsch (1994: 287) comments how “the GSM standard itself is an open 
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nonproprietary-standard, which means that not just the air interface is specified but all 
interconnections between the base station and network subsystems”. 
 
Nokia and Ericsson were key developers of the GSM standard.  Building from their experience 
with the advanced analogue standard, NMT-450 (featuring digital switches and other advances), 
both firms conducted much of the R&D that would later form the basis for GSM.  Once GSM 
became operational, both firms pushed the European Union to accept GSM as a European 
second generation digital standard.  Part of this process was making GSM completely open such 
that any firm could access all of the technical specifications. 
 
It is interesting to note how this approach differs to that used by the developers of other air 
interface protocols.  GSM is based upon Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) whereby a given 
bandwidth is divided in eight call timeslots.  The other main approach is to code multiple calls 
within a bandwidth (Call Division Multiple Access – CDMA).  However, whilst CDMA systems are 
also generally open (with the exception of some second generation Japanese systems), users of 
CDMA technology have to pay license fees.  For example, Ericsson completed a deal with the 
owner of the technology, Qualcomm, such that it could enter the CDMA market.  Due to these 
difficulties in accessing CDMA technology there is a significant gap between the technologies 
available for TDMA networks such as GSM and CDMA networks.  For example, Nokia has 
already released a phone with a chipset that will enable 18 days of standby time for GSM 
networks.  A similar product for CDMA networks is likely to be more than a year away. 
 
In addition, as the International Telecommunications Union tries to lead the industry into a 
position of having a single communications standard for third generation systems around the 
world, there is a general level of acceptance that CDMA technology is superior to that of TDMA 
 
  Page 23 
technology.  However, Nokia and Ericsson are both pushing for the wideband version to be 
adopted (W-CDMA) as adoption of the CDMA standard would require royalty payments to be 
made to intellectual property owners in the US.  To assist them in their fight for W-CDMA, Nokia 
and Ericsson are working with Japan’s leading provider in relation to networks, DoCoMo such 
that there is a united front pushing for a completely free and open standard. 
 
The move to make GSM a completely open standard by Nokia and Ericsson was, with the 
benefit of hindsight, a wise one.  Systems using the North American AMPS analogue standard 
(or related standards such as TACS) in 1996 far outnumbered those using the Nordic NMT or 
other analogue standards (103 nations versus 39), but where digital standards have been 
adopted, GSM outnumbers CDMA networks, 101 nations to three (Funk, 1998: 423). 
 
Connectivity Information Structure 
The second information structure has to do with operating the mobile phone within the 
established air interface protocol and thus it is here that there are enormous opportunities in the 
area of complementary products and services.  Much of this information structure is built around 
component level knowledge to do with various software elements.  There are also some 
hardware knowledge elements for specific pieces of hardware that interface with complementary 
products.  In general the approach taken by Nokia and Ericsson has been one of collaboration 
with selected partners.  For example, Nokia has already developed technologies with 
complementary firms to allow them to purchase items from sources such as vending machines 
and on public transport systems, with the charge going onto the monthly bill (Wooldridge, 1999).   
 
More advanced wireless technologies, where data is actually exchanged between devices (as 
opposed to simply sending data as in the case of payment systems) is being developed within 
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the Bluetooth Project.  Bluetooth is a wireless technology that seeks to replace the wires and 
cables between computers and other electronic devices in homes and offices with a local 
broadband wireless network.  Bluetooth was one of many potential technological solutions and 
Ericsson sought the support of other large backers to develop a critical mass of support. 
 
Initially begun with five members, Ericsson initiated a “Special Interest Group” (SIG) which now 
comprises members from mobile telecommunications, IT hardware and software, media, 
medical and industrial sectors.  All members of the SIG have access to necessary protocols to 
facilitate the development of hardware and software for Bluetooth applications.  Broader control 
of central elements of the standard (for example, changes in the protocol) is exercised by a 
“Promoter Group” (PG), currently comprising 3Com, Ericsson, Intel, IBM, Lucent, Microsoft, 
Motorola, Nokia and Toshiba.  The cooperative nature of the PG and SIG is the result of an early 
strategic decision by early developers of the technology – and most notably Ericsson.  While this 
firm was a founder of the Bluetooth consortium with Nokia, IBM, Intel and Toshiba, it was 
Ericsson that adopted the early technological champion role, undertaking essential early R&D 
which saw Bluetooth emerge from a competitive environment as the preferred wireless 
connectivity standard.  Today Ericsson has alliances with Microsoft and Qualcomm to develop 
both software and hardware for Bluetooth applications.  Similarly, Nokia has entered into an 
alliance with Japan’s Fuji to develop software for the transmission of digital photographs. 
 
The relative openness of information structures to do with connectivity can also be seen in the 
area of software.  Both Nokia and Ericsson are moving away from proprietary systems.  Most 
recently they have adopted a Java language based operating system by Psion, a provider of 
operating systems for personal communicators (devices that are bringing together mobile phone 
and computing technology) (Berendt, 1998: 30).  Psion's Java enabled operating system, 
 
  Page 25 
Symbian is licensed to the big three in the industry, Ericsson, Motorola and Nokia.  The adoption 
of Java as the language for the operating standard of personal communicators will allow further 
innovative programmers to contribute to product and industry development through the 
introduction of innovative ‘applets’.  Mobile phone producers, in utilizing Java, have ensured that 
providers of complementary products and services can develop their products (or services) in 
the knowledge that ‘plug and play’ capabilities can be relatively easily attained. 
 
In addition, rather than just hope for complementary products to emerge from other firms, Nokia 
and Ericsson have specifically encouraged cooperation between large and small manufacturers 
at the industry level within the Nordic region.  This has been further encouraged by explicit 
government policies in both Sweden, and more especially Finland, where the government 
helped establish technology parks in areas like Spinno, near Helsinki (Autio and Kloftsen, 1998).  
These parks, anchored by central players in the industry such as Nokia, saw the development of 
a range of small support firms with strong links to the university sector and government funding 
agencies.  These small firms have since been responsible for many of the innovative 
components associated with mobile phones.   
 
The information structures that were concerned with connectivity were generally far less 
accessible than those pertaining to the air interface protocols.  However, due to the need for 
complementary products and services, both Nokia and Ericsson went to considerable lengths to 
establish collaborative relationships with appropriate partners.  The Java based operating 
systems and Bluetooth projects were relatively open in terms of the information structures.  At 
the other end of the scale, some of their joint ventures with partners such as Siemans and 
Alcatel to produce enhanced communications performance through projects such as EDGE 
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(Enhanced Data for GSM Evolution) and Tiphon are far less open except in terms of the final 
protocols that affect the actual operation of the phone. 
 
Internal Workings Information Structure 
The third information structure covers the internal workings of the phones and is relatively 
independent of any complementary products or services.  It was here that there was the lowest 
level of accessibility of the underlying component level knowledge by other firms.  There were 
some example of joint ventures such as in the case of batteries and speakers (e.g Ericsson with 
Bang and Oulfsen).  In addition, the existence of a Java based operating system makes it 
possible for additional features to do with menus and data storage options to be easily 
incorporated.  However, in general, Nokia and Ericsson developed and controlled most of the 
underlying knowledge that forms part of this information structure. 
 
It is interesting to note that while this information structure is the least open of all, and by 
implication, the most protected, the elements that derive from this information structure are the 
easiest to copy.  It is for this reason that new and upgraded mobile phones are constantly being 
released.  Nokia for example, uses a relatively modular approach to the way it introduces 
innovations that relate to this information structure.  Their new 7110 model has an augmented 
display that is 80% larger than the 6110 model and incorporates a scroll button, but otherwise it 
contains most of the 6110 features.  The 3210 similarly recycles the entire menu structure of the 
5110, instead introducing some new styling and reducing the overall weight.  Although 
considered to be technologically behind Nokia, Ericsson follows a similar approach with their 
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The knowledge that underlies many of the advances that fall within this information structure 
would not seem to be embedded within organizational routines or requiring specialized assets 
that would make it difficult to copy.  Rather it is simply the pace of development that keeps rivals 
at bay.  The second tier mobile phone manufacturers (e.g. Alcatel, Philips, Siemans, Sony, NEC) 
have an option to either try and copy the functionality of Nokia or Ericsson phones or to try and 
develop and innovative feature themselves.  To copy existing functions is generally not seen as 
a winning strategy as whilst new models used to come out every two years, the adoption of a 
modular approach is ensuring that there are now far more regular new product offerings.  Thus a 
copy strategy will still see the second tier players falling behind and most likely will be unable to 
achieve the necessary economies of scale to effectively compete on price.  Thus, innovations 
are generally eventually copied, but the constant upgrading of component level knowledge 
allows Nokia and Ericsson to regularly release new innovative models.  The protection of this 
information structure tends to be based more around simply developing at a faster rate than 
competitors rather than implementing specific protection systems or through trying to embed 
critical knowledge components within the organization. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The case of Nokia and Ericsson coming to dominate the mobile phone manufacturing industry 
(along with Motorola) is an excellent example of carefully managing information structures such 
that some knowledge is protected and other knowledge is purposely diffused.  Starting with the 
GSM standard, the complete openness of the air interface protocol allowed multiple firms in all 
areas of the industry to become involved.  The result is that the GSM standard has been 
adopted in 101 nations around the world (versus three for the CDMA standard).  This has 
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provided a very large installed base for all those firms that create products or services for the 
industry within the GSM standard. 
 
While the domination of the GSM standard has the potential to benefit Nokia and Ericsson as 
two of the key developers of the technology, the openness of the standard has meant that any 
longer term sustainable advantages must derive from a superior product and more 
complementary products and services relative to other GSM oriented competitors.  It is here that 
the true value of keeping some technical knowledge embedded and making other elements 
explicit, is best seen.  The use of strategic alliances to rapidly develop complementary products 
and services has meant sharing elements of technical knowledge with these selected partners.  
Most of this knowledge has to do with interface specifications and software operation, but it does 
mean that there is the potential for proprietary knowledge to slowly diffuse across the industry.  
Serious knowledge leakage has been minimized by selecting appropriate partners and through 
simply keeping the rate of change so high that by the time this knowledge can be incorporated 
into competitors’ products, it is outdated. 
 
The use of some knowledge being more open and accessible to a range of firms is best seen in 
the use of a Java based operating systems and a defined protocol for wireless communications 
(Bluetooth).  These less protected elements of the information structure keep the barriers to 
entry into complementary segments of the industry low and thus allow for the involvement of 
other firms (such as those within the technology parks in Finland) where the alliances are not as 
closely selected or monitored.  This trend of developing alliances continues today on a global 
scale with the Nordic phone manufacturers having extensive linkages with firms in Silicon Valley.  
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Those elements of knowledge that do not interface with other products or services and are not 
required for the development of complementary products and services are generally protected 
wherever possible.  For example, Nokia exercises tight control over their knowledge of power 
reduction circuitry, creating a situation whereby competitors’ phones are unable to offer the 
same level of functionality for the same weight and are at a distinct disadvantage in the market 
place.  This type of knowledge is of key importance given the many of the complementary 
products and services (even though often developed by Nokia) are available to all users of GSM 
mobile phones (such as using the phone as a smart card technology for purchasing goods or 
services). 
 
Most interestingly, whilst the GSM standard is completely open, Nokia and Ericsson have not 
lost their competitive position in the industry in the same way that Matsushita became just 
another video recorder manufacturer, or IBM became just one of many PC manufacturers.  They 
have managed to avoid this pitfall that often seems to accompany the developers of standards 
largely because they have managed to keep at least some of the knowledge that underlies their 
competitive position protected.  In addition, where they have shared knowledge as a way of 
encouraging the development of complementary products and services, they have wherever 
possible chosen their alliance partner carefully and only in two situations have they made parts 
of their ‘connectivity’ information structure open. 
 
In reviewing how some knowledge has been actively diffused throughout the industry and other 
elements have been heavily protected, the notion of information structures has been particularly 
useful.  By being able to systematically cluster knowledge into key groupings based upon the 
interdependence of key components, we were able to structure our review of how different 
clusters of knowledge were managed using a schema that was appropriate for this industry.  The 
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information structures approach would seem to have advantages over Henderson and Clark’s 
(1990) architectural and component level knowledge concept as their approach does not 
adequately allow for clustering of technical knowledge based around selected functionality. 
 
In conclusion, the mobile phone industry today is one where compatibility and network 
externalities are becoming more and more important.  This has led to some standardization.  
However, Nokia and Ericsson, as prime proponents of the GSM standard have not lost their 
competitive position within the industry.  We have been able to show how they have managed 
various components of their knowledge through the use of information structures as clusters of 
technical knowledge based around the operation of interdependent components executing 
particular functions. 
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